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Abstract 
Drawing on discourse analyses of 36 in-depth interviews with elite business people from 
Turkey, the study identifies the networking patterns of new and established business elites in 
the context of economic liberalization and socio-religious transformation of the country. 
Through a comparative analysis of the so-called secular and religious elite networks, we 
demonstrate the role of institutional actors such as the government, and identity networks, 
based on religion and place of birth in shaping the form and content of social networks 
among business elites in Turkey. In order to achieve this, we operationalise Bourdieu’s 
notion of theory of practice and Granovetter’s theory of social networks, illustrating the 
utility of combing these approaches in explicating the form and content of social networks in 
their situated contexts, in which power and divergent interests are negotiated. 
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Introduction 
 
Studies on business elites seem to have attracted limited attention in spite of the calls by 
prominent authors (see Pettigrew, 1992; Whittington, 2004; Savage and Williams, 2008; Zald 
and Lounsbury, 2010). Whittington (2004:62) stresses the need for a sociological agenda 
interested in “understanding strategy’s elites” since their actions may have important 
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repercussions for society. Drawing on a field study with in-depth interviews, we identify the 
liberal policies and conservative forces prevailing in the Turkish context on business 
networks of the corporate elites. The adoption of liberalization policy in 1980 and Islamic 
tendencies increasingly surfacing in the same period makes Turkish business milieu a 
valuable setting in which to investigate the impact of the context on corporate elite’s business 
networks. Businesspeople
1’s associations together with their respective ideologies and 
member profiles are investigated in a way to assess the interplay of their form and substance 
with the changing conditions, primarily borne out of the liberalization of economic policies 
and an increased emphasis on religion.  
 
Two divergent approaches are evident in theorization of social networks in their situated 
setting. First, Granovetter’s theory of social networks explains that human relations, is not 
conjugated only in terms of instrumental rationality, but also of sociability, approval, status 
and power (Granovetter, 1985).  Second, Bourdieu’s theory of practice illustrates the relative 
stability of capitals, choices and chances of individuals and networks across fields of relations 
(Authors, 2006). Combined together Granovetter and Bourdieu’s theoretical approaches 
promise to capture the coexistence of dynamism and stability, in other words, change and 
continuity, in social networks (Authors, 2012). This study identifies the networking patterns 
of new and established business elites in the context of economic liberalization and socio-
religious transformation of the country. Through a comparative analysis of the so-called 
secular and religious elite networks, we demonstrate the significance of context in 
understanding social networks as sites, where power and interests are negotiated. Developing 
Granovetter’s theory of social networks, we mobilise concepts from Bourdieusian sociology 
                                                          
1
 The original title of these associations can be translated as “Businessmen” associations. However, all of them 
have female member as well. For this reason, throughout the paper, we preferred to use the term 
“Businesspeople” 
 3 
 
and demonstrate the significant role of institutional actors such as the government, and 
identity formations, based on religion or place in shaping the form and content of social 
networks among business elites in Turkey. 
 
 
Instead of emphasizing the affective features of the human action which is constructed upon 
similarities and familiarities engendering trust in human relationships, Granovetter initially 
stressed that action develops rather in a network of seemingly less-affective ties, namely 
weak ties, that the use by actors results in a type of relationship involving greater number of 
individuals (Granovetter, 1973: 1369). He also argues that not every weak tie but rather, the 
ties capable to establish direct and unique links between unconnected actors (bridges) have 
the capacity to shape an effective relationship (Granovetter, 1985: 208). Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice and the field illustrates, however, that an individual’s endowment of symbolic and 
material resources, i.e. different forms of capital, render their actions predictable among a 
milieu of actors.  
 
Although the emergence and development of business networks in Turkey, have some 
divergent aspects vis-à-vis Granovetter’s weak ties approach, the crucial role played by 
bridges in a network of business relationships seems to display similarities. Instead of 
communal relationships based on proximity, familiarity, traditionally-determined trust 
systems, newly emerging networks of businesspeople offer to their adherents a quite different 
type of cooperation in Turkey. Although they seem to have implicit yet ideologically-driven 
qualities, such as religious orientation, conservatism, protectionism, secular and modern 
conception of the world, in their formation, they, in fact, tend to form a new kind of ad hoc 
entity to resist the pressures and necessities of the globalization. Drawing on Bourdieu, it is 
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possible to explicate how with new elites emerge a new set of rules, forms and substantial 
network relationships. While Granovetter accounts for the dynamism in networks, Bourdieu’s 
approach allows us to present dynamism in the context of stability in the broad field of 
relations. 
 
Biggart and Delbridge (2004) with their typology of exchange systems, point out an 
alternative perspective. By a distinction between price system (universalistic instrumental 
rationality), associative system (particularistic instrumental rationality), moral system 
(universalistic substantive rationality) and communal system (particularistic substantive 
rationality), they classify major forms of exchange based on the openness level of the group 
towards outsiders (universalistic/particularistic) and their relation with the instrumental logic 
(direction of the calculus between means and ends). Most Turkish business associations seem 
to be characterized by a blend of moral and communal systems. Especially the newly rising 
ones appear to prioritize the in-group harmony through an apparent ideological or moral 
motivation, paving the way to integration with a global price system.  
 
Granovetter  (1983) has further developed his initial theoretical model with other empirical 
data, which confirm that weak ties in inter firm relationships facilitate the creation of 
cooperation and coordination in the national network of economic actors. Capitals of 
Bourdieu (1979) are utilized to assess characteristics of network members as well as their 
actions towards domination. Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory we show the importance of social 
capital as well as economic and cultural capitals in shaping the context of Turkish business 
elites. Our analysis on the formation, structure and functionality of the business associations 
in Turkey reveal both an articulation with the network-basis perspectives, especially the one 
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developed by Granovetter, and a reevaluation and a micro-adaptation of the Bourdieu’s 
notion of capitals in today’s changing Turkish business world. 
 
Burt (2005) proposes in his both challenging and complementing approach to Granovetter, a 
consideration of a relatively under-estimated aspect of network system and focuses on 
“structural holes”. He accentuates the contribution of the network relationships to the 
enrichment of the social capital. According to Burt, a network rich of holes (unconnected 
persons or clusters of relationship) is more promising than that paved of familiar connections, 
because relatedness depends on the communicative capacity offered by the discontinuous 
network.  Unknown, unexplored identities and beliefs can be an effective source to multiply 
the social capital (Burt, 2005: 17). On the other hand, Townley (2002:561) criticizes the 
taken-for-granted characteristic of the modernist rationalistic and mechanical models that try 
to analyze the macro-structures, but often under-estimate the importance of the “micro-
physics of power”. Instead, she proposes a notion of organization which is complex, 
interactive and dynamic, consisting of multiple and complex interactions and circular 
causality. In fact, in this study we draw attention to power and domination within and around 
the businesspeople networks in Turkey.  
 
Lounsbury and Ventresca (2003) claim that Bourdieu’s approach to the conception of capital 
and consequently to the meaning of social relationships instigated the rise of a new 
structuralism in management studies.  This approach emphasizes the comprehension of the 
connection between intraorganizational networks and broader societal dynamics that 
influence the prospects for voice in specific surroundings.  The impact of Bourdieu’s theory 
on the production of domination through social capital has thus interwoven a wide range of 
critical reflections in the management and organization studies.  
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Drawing on Bourdieu allows us to re-theorize context as a significant aspect of network 
relationships: Political context, in particular the interplay of religion, state, trade unions, 
employers are ignored in the network theory, which assumes that context is fixed, and not 
relevant to such theorization. In the European setting, we need to consider context more 
keenly as the institutional differences are often outcome of unique historical paths. For 
example, in their review of diversity management field, Authors (2011) identify that 
discourses and practices in this field of management are shaped by both macro-economic 
forces of liberalization, and social changes such as decline of social solidarity and surge of 
individualism. They also demonstrate that institutional actors such as trade unions, employers 
unions, professional bodies, universities and consulting businesses play important roles in 
negotiating the form and structure of the field. They use the Bourdieusian concept of the field 
in order to bring a macro-economic and social dimension to our understanding of social 
networks. The concept of the field allows us to bring in history, place and relationship among 
actors in order to understand how certain practices and network ties are maintained.  
 
By exploring multiple actors and their positions, we are also able to reveal relationships of 
power in its situated emic context if we use Bourdieusian concept of the field. Therefore in 
this study, we bring an assessment of power and context in order to develop social network 
theory by adding it a macro-context. We believe that this is important in understanding 
contexts, such as Turkey, which fall outside the traditional imagination of western 
theorization. Assessing history and place in reading social networks can help us draw an emic 
understanding of relevant processes, freeing our theorization from etic Western concepts of 
social network formation, the transposition of which may not be so suitable in the case of 
Turkey. We believe that the absence of macro perspective in social network theorization is 
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also problematic at the source of much social network theorization. In fact, providing macro 
context in western theorization can delineate fine distinctions between countries and histories 
which shape our understanding of social networks in the western world, which is not a 
monolithic, uniform entity.  
 
Contextual assessment of Turkey in the process of economic liberalization and socio-
religious transformation 
 
Turkey is a country of civil law and its legal system contributes to the central role of the state 
in the Turkish business system (Authors, 2012). Consistent with the predictions of the Legal 
Origins theory, the economy is mostly guided by state desired allocations rather than market 
based outcomes (La Porta et al., 2008). Turkish business context is typically characterized by 
the family-controlled, diversified big business groups (Guillén, 2001) whose development 
was encouraged by the state. The state formed partnerships with these businesses, provided 
credits from state banks and low cost inputs, and protected them from foreign competition 
(Buğra, 1994). The intricate nature of the relationship between the state and the business 
firms necessitates a careful handling of this link and enforces owning families to take part in 
the management of their companies (Buğra, 1994).  
 
These basic characteristics of the business system in Turkey continue in spite of the major 
macroeconomic policy shifts. Turkish economic policy reached a breaking point in the 
beginning of 1980. The preceding decade was subject to high inflation rate coupled with the 
erratic regulatory regimes caused by political instability which made high levels of 
uncertainty the basic characteristic of doing business in Turkey (Yurtoglu, 2004).  
Abandoning import substitution policy that has been focusing on the domestic market, a trade 
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liberalization program based on export promotion was launched in the early 1980s (Yurtoglu, 
2000).  Turkey was to adapt herself to the realities and requisites of the global economy and 
the globalization process, which demanded a “restructuration” of the national economy. 
Therefore, the system of mixed economy was abandoned, state economic enterprises were 
privatized, and a series of neo-liberal policies were launched in order to quit the existing 
“nationalist development model” in favor of the transition to global capitalism (Türe, 2008: 
89).   
 
As a consequence several initiatives were taken. In 1986, Istanbul Stock Exchange was 
founded. The economic liberalization also brought in notions such as human resource 
strategies to the Turkish business context (Ercek, 2006; Kaya, 2006; Kaya et.al, 2010; 
Collings et.al, 2010; Kusku and Ataman, 2011; Gurbuz and Mert, 2011) With these large 
scale reforms supported also by the majority of the economic elites, the control on foreign 
currency was abandoned, the value of the Turkish Lira was determined by the market, foreign 
capital entry controls was suppressed and attempts to develop capital from Islamic, especially 
Arab countries were made (Öniş, 2004). The same period was also characterized by an 
attempt to combine Islamic identity with liberal economy (Lacinok, 2007). This tendency 
further enforced by the victory of pro-Islamist parties in 1990s and 2000s.  Particularly, the 
pro-Islamist AKP that have been governing since 2002 promised to respect integrally the 
neo-liberal economic policies deployed since the 1980s.  
 
The Anatolian conservative entrepreneurs, weary of AKP’s predecessor’s politically risky 
discourses (pro-Islamic parties have already been banned several times by the Constitutional 
Court, on grounds of anti-secular activities destined to install an Islamic regime) needed a 
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political organization which allied Islamic belief with pragmatism, but gave priority to 
private enterprise, free market, competition and profits (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009). 
 
Following the liberalization, the industrial production, primarily limited to Istanbul and 
Marmara region became scattered throughout Anatolia, thanks to the proliferation of export 
oriented small and medium size enterprises operating in various industrial zones that reflected 
the dynamism of the ambitious entrepreneurs passing from local to global markets, even 
without transiting by the national one (Keyman, and Lorasdağı, 2010). This proliferation was 
also stimulated by the large businesses of the Marmara region, which outsourced part of their 
production to the Anatolian companies (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010) while competing in 
international markets.  
 
Transition to liberal economy and the attempts to combine Islamic identity with liberal 
economy influenced considerably business networks. A proliferation of the businesspeople 
associations with a religious accent characterized the period following the economic and 
social transformation. The new Anatolian conservative economic and political elites who 
once felt that they were socially and culturally “excluded” savored their common triumph, 
and displayed openly their interests in securing their proper seats among the established 
elites. The religiously conservative  entrepreneur groups, not only those dwelling in 
Anatolian cities but also those operating in Istanbul and Marmara region were also willing to 
improve their social networks. As an alternative  to the “Turkish  Association of Industrialists 
and Businesspeople” (TUSIAD-Türkiye Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği) founded in the 1971 
by the modernist established economic elites of the Istanbul area, the  Anatolian  
entrepreneurs, close to then leading pro-Islamist Welfare Party (RP), created in 1990, 
MUSIAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği) “The Association of Independent  
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Industrialists and Businesspeople” (Pamuk, 2008). The first three letters of the denomination 
of “Müstakil” meaning independent could also be read as “Muslim”.  While TUSIAD’s 
membership size is relatively small and composed of large firms mainly located in Istanbul 
and surrounding areas, MUSIAD’s membership size is larger and geographically spread and 
mainly composed of SMEs (Öniş and Türem, 2001). However, TUSIAD’s members 
manufacture 65 percent of total industrial production and their share in total exports is about 
85 percent (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010). MUSIAD has close ties with the pro-Islamist parties 
and intends to play a pressure group role in favor of its members at governmental spheres 
(Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010).  
 
Another business network “The Confederation of Turkish Businesspeople and Industrialists” 
(TUSKON), that shelters religiously conservative entrepreneurs was founded in 2005 
(Sönmez, 2010). But its founders and members mostly belong to Fethullah Gülen’s religious 
community, and keep a certain distance with MUSIAD  (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010). Gülen 
maintains a “concept of the secular world as “dar-ul hizmet” (the abode of service to 
mankind), which he substitutes for the traditional notion of “dar-ul harb” (the abode of war 
against infidels) (Mango, 2006). This perspective is similar to the basic tenet of other 
religiously inspired business networks, such as the Opus Dei, for the members of which all 
work should be performed as divine service” (Mango, 2006).  In TUSKON Islamic 
references are kept in second plan while nationalist discourses are deployed:  Islam is 
characterized as an important element of Turkish nationalism (Buğra and Savaşkan. 2010: 
104). TUSKON especially provides network for local SME’s willing to reach to foreign 
markets and find also raw materials for their productions. The impressive educational 
institutions created by Gülen’s followers in five continents, from Asia to Africa, from 
Australia to USA are also of help for additional contacts for infiltrating global markets 
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(Buğra and Savaşkan. 2010).  In these schools the instruction language is Turkish along with 
English and the curriculum familiarizes students with Turkish culture. 
 
A widely shared common idea about the role of the religion in Turkey is that it functions as a 
basis for the generation of a closed and defensive world conception. Consequently, religion 
has long been conceived as the main theme of a polarization between a modern attitude and a 
conservative posture (Mardin, 2004: 82). Nevertheless, recent studies expose a series of data 
asserting that religion in Turkey does not only coalesce with a self-protectionist anti-
modernism, but rather it furnishes instruments to a personal inner guide-line through a rapidly 
changing society and facilitates the integration in a world of global fluencies (Göle, 1991; 
2000). In the last decade, it appears that religious movements in Turkey have started to 
manifest themselves within civil society organizations mostly and separated from the strict 
ideology of political Islam (Yılmaz, 2005). Especially, the religiously rooted business 
associations managed to produce a secularized discourse. For instance, TUSKON linked with 
the Gulen movement is an appropriate example of this new discourse. They put great 
emphasis on the secular premises of business rather than making Islamic values so evident.   
Exploring the impact of this newly emerging religious middle class on business world may 
also bring a new perspective to our understanding of network theory.  
 
Turkey provides a rich context in which elites can be studied in the process of social, 
economic and political changes. Evidence of differences between new and old elites allows 
for an understanding of how elites change or struggle to retain their elite status. Therefore, 
the study here provides insights into new and old elites struggles towards becoming and 
remaining elite in the corporate world respectively.  
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Methodology 
 
Drawing upon the view that “elites are those groups that hold or exercise domination within a 
society or within a particular area of life” (Scott, 2008:32) we have defined business elites as 
the leading executive figures (such as chairperson, vice chairperson and CEO) of the holding 
companies whose affiliates are listed among the largest 500 companies in Turkey. This 
definition is also consistent with previous studies which perceive corporate elite as “a 
configuration of capitalists (major shareholders and top executives) and organic intellectuals 
occupying positions of ultimate authority within leading corporations” (Carroll, 2008:47). 
 
The sample of the study was drawn from the owners and the managers of the largest Turkish 
companies for a larger study on elites in 2009-2011. A sub sample of 36 interviews is used 
for the present analysis. Elite networks are assessed through the membership to the largest 
businesspeople associations in Turkey namely. TUSIAD, MUSIAD and TUSKON. The data 
concerning businesspeople associations are gathered both through interviews and secondary 
information sources. This is an exploratory study which consists of a research design 
involving the exploration of a research topic or theory rather than being a test of it (Myers, 
2009:23). Discourse analysis is conducted to analyze the data.  
----------------------------------------- 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Findings and Discussions 
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Given the multidisciplinary nature of the work, we draw on the theories from sociology, 
political science and management. Thus, using elite theories (Carroll, 2008; Scott, 2008), and 
social network perspectives, we unveil the relationship between the context and elite 
networks. Theoretical abstraction presents a middle-range model concerning the formation 
and the functions of existing and emerging networks in Turkish business system. Different 
business networks (in the form of businesspeople’s associations) accomplish specific 
functions, with sometimes complementing and mostly conflicting interests. Nevertheless, 
business associations are subject to the same contextual forces such as the world economy, 
dynamics of international relations, and political setting, crises and social movements, as well 
as ideologically-driven trends at the national level at the same historical moment. Yet, each 
business association is at a different stage of organizational evolution: while the long 
established one is at the peak of its integration with the global market and is sufficiently 
mature, the new one is in the phase of growth as it takes effectives steps to be more active in 
global market. Table 1 displays differences between TUSIAD, MUSIAD and TUSKON in 
relation to their level of development at international and national scale. 
 
We provide a three layered framework through which we examine business networks in 
terms of their form and content in the global, national and association level relationships in 
the conclusion section of this paper. We also elaborate how these layers of relationships 
interplay with each other.  Macro-Global aspects of business network relations 
 
The business associations are about domination which leads to an exclusion of those who do 
not culturally conform and they generate a feeling of incompatibility on the part of those who 
hit the barrier of the domination (Authors, 2011). Consequently, a new network defining 
itself ‘other’ than the one preceding it, emerges as sufficient need is condensed around a 
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motivational force towards global market. This being ‘other’ is not only explicitly encoded in 
cultural assets but also in  specific needs such as integration with the global and national 
economy as experienced by this specific group of businesspersons.  
Different networks meet on the aims of an economic mutuality for a growing business and 
global integration. This is how we can explain the synchronic existence of a series of 
networks, diverging culturally or ideologically, but completing thus an evolutionary 
landscape of the business world. As mentioned above these businesspeople networks differ in 
the type and level of their needs. TUSIAD members are big players and they are well 
connected with the rest of the world. They have mostly western cultural references. Several 
of them have led major international associations in their business field. They also appear to 
be members of the major international NGOs in their sector.  
 
“I was elected as the chair of the World X Manufacturers Association for two years”. 
(Chairman of a large industrial group). 
 
Interesting to note that there was no affiliation of international associations among   
MUSIAD and TUSKON members. There is lack of integration with global networks 
MUSIAD/TUSKON members seem to be less familiar with the foreign markets and cultures. 
In contrast to TUSIAD members who have experienced foreign collaborations even before 
the economic liberalization, the newcomers like MUSIAD and TUSKON members have 
mostly appeared in the largest companies list or grew after the policy change in 1980. Being 
new in both national and international markets appears as a constraining factor especially in 
international business. However, especially in the case of TUSKON this is being overcome 
thanks to the schools of Gülen all over the world (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2010) which are 
attended, especially in less developed countries, by the children of local elites.   In fact, with 
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a careful examination of the web page of TUSKON it is observed that international relations 
with potential trade partners are created and maintained by the activities of this association. 
Therefore, TUSKON as a community functions as an international network provider. Thus, 
its members do not act individually in the international arena but they rather get introduced to 
international markets through community based activities offered to each member.  
 
“TUSKON performs great internationally” (Chairman of a manufacturing company-
TUSKON member).  
 
Since the business contracts are assured through collective business trips to or from a country 
that are organized by TUSKON, participants reported similar investments in some countries, 
for example Brasil, among TUSKON members.  On the other hand, TUSIAD members enjoy 
the benefits of being the members of an old association integrated with the world. Their 
“establishedness,” experience, economic size provide the necessary means to conduct 
business through the community (TUSIAD) and individually.  
 
“I have many partnerships. Many people cannot get along with westerners but I work 
very well with them. I have a partnership with the major player in the sector in 
Germany. (…) This year, I have also been appointed to the International 
Communication Committee at TUSIAD (Chairman of a large group. TUSIAD 
member). 
 
 TUSIAD members did not only establish individual trade partnerships but they also acted as 
leaders in promoting trade relations with specific countries. Their efforts were also 
recognized by different states. 
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“I have been awarded by the Royal Order of Merit of Spain by the King for promoting 
trade relations between the two countries” (Chairman of a large group-TUSIAD 
member). 
 
Meso-National aspects of business network relations 
 
Business associations are also subject to the legacy of their foundation. We observe that the 
period of foundation, as in specific time and historical moment, institutes a different 
organizational habitus in each association. TUSIAD was established in 1971 in an unstable 
context characterized by social unrest and employer-employee conflicts, where social 
democrats and liberal conservatives used to compete for the government. TUSIAD was 
established to provide a network for the private sector rather than to represent the interests of 
business people (Buğra, 1998).  Both MUSIAD and TUSKON emerged after 1980 where 
religious tone was remarkable in the discourse of the governments. Each network was 
established as a semi-reactionary movement towards the secular cultural codes represented by 
the older one. 
 
Based on these perspectives, the present study investigates the inner dynamics of the Turkish 
business networks as well as the forces in the context contributing to their survival. The 
changing political and economic climate after 1980 facilitated the rise and growth of new 
networks. The rise of Islamic tendencies at the government level further encouraged new 
businesspeople networks which seemingly base their discourse on religion. This supportive 
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environment was also reflected in the comments of the interviewees from 
MUSIAD/TUSKON. 
 
During the crisis the president of the republic visited us and showed his emotional 
support” (Chairman, TUSKON member large industrial holding) 
 
While he was proud of enjoying the support of the actual president, he was openly expressing 
his disappointment by the neglect of a previous president not close to Islamist tendency  
 
“Even though I create employment and export a considerable part of my production, 
previous president [of the republic] never invited me to the presidential palace. 
However, the actual president invites.” (Chairman, TUSKON member, large 
industrial holding) 
 
The old elite businesspeople network, TUSIAD do not seem to benefit from the same level of 
political support in the 2000s. The discourse of the several of its members indicated a lack of 
support even a counteraction from government.  
 
“The government wants to eradicate us” (CEO of TUSIAD member, large industrial 
holding) 
 
It is also argued that the new religious business class is the reason for the emergence of AKP.  
In the post 1980s political atmosphere, the affinity between politics and religious 
businesspeople appears to be their taste for liberal policies. In fact, our research focusing on 
the transformation of the economic elites’ networks following the contextual shift delineates 
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a significant change in the relative position of the religion among Turkish businesspeople. 
Despite the manifestation of nuanced attitudes, religion (the Islamic faith) in general seems to 
have become the primary common denominator in the new elites’ networks. 
 
“I am a TUSİAD member” 
Interviewer: Are you a member of MUSİAD or TUSKON?” 
“They are more politicized. TUSİAD is different. Since MUSIAD, etc have political 
inclinations I would not like to be involved in. But I interact with all kind of groups in 
Ankara.” (Chairman of a group) 
 
 According to the findings of our study, the newly emerging economic elites, who are mostly 
from a provincial-origin, adopt a more or less manifest religious attitude in their self-
expression and manners. Majority of MUSIAD/TUSKON members in our study state that 
they fully practice their religious beliefs. However, they are highly motivated for constituting 
business networks that aim integration with global liberal market, instead of preserving the 
reactionary conservative point of view.  
 
“I am a faithful person. I fulfill all my religious duties, however, I am not fanatic. I 
would not mind for example going to a restaurant where alcohol is served.  Or when I 
have a foreign client and we go for a dinner. He drinks alcoholic beverages at the 
same table. I would respect him. I have respect for every belief. I do not mind that he 
is Christian or Jewish or Armenian. I do have respect to all of them. Thanks God I am 
not fanatic.” (…) I am not a member of TUSIAD. I do not share some of its views. 
TUSIAD is not democratic. But I am not against trading with them. (Chairman of 
large group). 
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Networking is not always a strict adherence to a certain business association, with or without 
political connotation, but, for some of our interviewees, it is a question of developing a 
sufficiently diversified social capital, as a safeguard against contextual fluctuations. 
 “I do not have a membership in any association. However, my cousins, brothers [all 
partners in the same group] are members somewhere. My cousin is a member of 
TUSKON, my brothers are member of TUSIAD.” (Chairman of a large group). 
 
Micro-association aspects of business network relations 
 
Every network is constituted of main components and the systematic cooperation evokes the 
establishment of (and around) a social capital, allowing in, those who share the same cultural 
codes (cultural capital) and exclude those who do not. Similarly those not sharing the same 
characteristics do not dare or want to become a part of the network. This was quite evident in 
the discourses of the businesspeople who did not join TUSIAD.  
“TUSIAD is too big for us” (Chairman and CEO in a holding from Istanbul). 
 
In fact, there are significant discrepancies between the economic, social and cultural capitals 
of the adherents of TUSIAD, MUSIAD and TUSKON in our sample. Given the overlaps 
between the MUSIAD and TUSKON members and the commonalities in their religious tone 
we preferred to put them together. Our findings show that TUSIAD membership is associated 
with the largest economic power. Its members in our sample are usually from companies 
whose sales exceeded 500 million or even 1 billion USD. The association with relatively 
smaller size companies is worth noting in the cases of MUSIAD and TUSKON members.  
Quotes of the TUSIAD members often underline the size of their businesses:  
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“We have the largest factory in the world in a single site.” (CEO of a large group).  
Interesting to note that they tend to express the size of their companies in comparison to 
global or European scale. They make explicit that they are able to compete in global markets. 
They also express their economic capital in terms of their international market share:     
 “We are the largest 3rd  in market share in Europe.” (Chairman of a large industrial 
group) 
 
The divergence between the respective cultural capitals of these different networks’ members 
is also considerable. TUSIAD members appear to have an undergraduate degree often from a 
university in USA or UK. They are also likely to have a graduate degree.  The majority of 
TUSIAD members are also graduates of prestigious high schools where the instruction 
language is a foreign language. This is consistent with the fact that majority of this group 
seem to be able to speak more than one foreign language.  
 
Among this group, there seems to be a trend about collecting paintings and (to a much lower 
degree) antiquities as well as establishing private universities or museums bearing the name 
of the family. They have western tastes. 
 
“My interest is highest for plastic arts.  (…) I visit art exhibitions, select artworks in 
national and international biennales and art fairs. I have a great interest in [classical] 
music but unfortunately only as a spectator I do not play any instrument. I am also 
interested in literature (…) I practice two types of sports: First is the one I do 
regularly as eating, sleeping.(…)  I have also favorite sports: I practice equitation 
since my childhood. My father introduced me to it. I do sailing since longtime. I 
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played soccer (…). I like skiing.” (Chairman of a large industrial group-TUSIAD 
member). 
 
While similar discourses have often been observed among TUSIAD members, MUSIAD and 
TUSKON members mentioned different tastes. The latters are usually interested in more 
popular sports and music types. 
“I walk three days per week in the health club of the X Hospital. (…) I listen to the 
Turkish traditional popular music. (…)  I do not have any other relationship with art. 
(Chairman of a large industrial group- TUSKON member) 
 
MUSIAD and TUSKON members in our sample seem to differ considerably from TUSIAD 
members along the cultural capitals.  Large majority does not have an undergraduate degree 
and none a graduate degree. The distance of the university to the city of dwelling appears as a 
major problem causing this limited time in educational institutions. The expectation that the 
older son should work in the family business was another reason which prevented further 
studies. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------- 
However, it is also worth mentioning that the children of MUSIAD and TUSKON members 
seem to achieve better education levels. They have undergraduate degrees and some of them 
prefer US universities. Thus heirs have a better education record and are able to speak foreign 
languages. Half of the TUSKON members in our sample do not know any foreign language. 
Most of them seem to have spent little time abroad and only for business trips. When we 
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evaluate the presence of elite tastes as defined by Bourdieu we see that such tastes are 
inexistent. For example, none of them collects paintings or antiquities in contrast to TUSIAD 
members. However, the trend of establishing universities is also observed among TUSKON 
members. They get together with similar others to create new universities usually for a 
“foundation” and get actively involved in the board of trustees. Their more collectivistic 
orientation is worth noting. 
“My son is the head of the board of trustees in our university. 
Whose university is that? 
A foundation’s.  (Chairman of a group-TUSKON member) 
 
They are usually proud of contributing to these joint efforts of creating new universities. 
However, although those are joint efforts they tend to emphasize their own contributions. For 
them this is clearly a symbolic capital through which they gain legitimacy and reputation.  
“I have constructed a Business and Economics Faculty. Ten people, we have provided 
4 trillion Turkish Liras ($2.2 million). (Chairman of an industrial company-TUSKON 
member) 
 
Significant differences are also observed along the social capital dimension among TUSIAD 
and MUSIAD/TUSKON members in our sample. The notion of social capital appears to be 
the underlying concept of Bourdieu’s thinking on the phenomenon of domination (Bourdieu, 
1979). He conceptualizes social capital as a sum of actual or potential resources deriving 
from the very fact of possessing a more or less institutionalized network of durable 
relationships. The latter are also shaped in a process of interconnaissance or 
interreconnaissance which means that the social capital implies an affiliation with a group 
which is not only a set of common features, but also a system of permanent and useful links 
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(Bourdieu, 1980: 2). Social capital creating useful links display various characteristics for the 
businesspeople networks we analyzed. One of the dimensions we wanted to assess is the 
father profession. In the case of TUSIAD members, the father profession appears to be 
industrialist. On the other hand “merchant” or “craftsman” appears as the father profession 
for MUSIAD/TUSKON members in our sample. There is only one exception who is farmer. 
Another dimension to assess social capital is the city of birth. Interestingly, we see that more 
than half of the TUSIAD members in our sample were born in cities other than metropolitan 
areas. On the other hand, all the MUSIAD/TUSKON members in our sample were born in 
non-metropolitan areas.  
 
Interrelationships between macro, meso, and micro levels 
 
Given the findings of our study we develop a model which is composed of interconnected 
parts, akin to a network that involves parts tied together with needs and functions that 
necessitate a form of organization, based on the use of cultural signs and a shared habitus to 
nurture trust system which generates legitimacy, credibility, economic cooperation and 
ideology.  
 
The existing metropolitan-origin established business networks display mundane and 
western-oriented cultural characteristics while the new formations rather use religious themes 
and the explicit conservative attitude as a kind of ingredient of articulation with the capitalist 
relations at the world scale. In other words, conservatism functions, in rapidly changing 
social-economic context of Turkey, as a protecting cocoon, a kind of anti-shock armor for the 
sufficiently motivated individual who desires to be integrated into the global market, but who 
does not dispose the necessary cultural equipment that should support the logic of 
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competitiveness. This might also be one of the main reasons that frequently generates an 
inner debate between conservatives-Islamists on being or not hypocritical about religion 
(Vergin, 2000: 62). We think that from bottom up this is an inevitable conflict triggered by 
the social change and forms of adaptation shared by conservative strata.  
 
In spite of such a distance towards the non-material aspect of the globalization, the apparently 
conservative economic elite seems to approach to the values relative to a pluralistic point of 
view, a remarkable tendency to moral tolerance, a systematic recognition of cultural 
differences, often intellectually supported through the traditional humanism that the 
references are found in the traditional humanism reminiscent of the Sufi philosophy of Rumi 
or other historical Anatolian half-mythic and thus flexible stance towards Islam since 
centuries. In fact, Turkish Islam has a traditional orientation towards the state which 
facilitated its pragmatic and flexible tone. In other words, because Turkish Islam, as 
represented by religious functionaries, has traditionally done the state’s bidding, it accepted 
the secularist order without demur (Mango, 2006:56). This flexible stance is also visible in 
the discourses of the MUSIAD/TUSKON members: 
 
“…I do practice my religion however I have many friends who do not. For example, I 
often go out with them for a dinner, they drink alcoholic beverages and I don’t and I 
do not mind it. Everybody is free to do what he/she wishes.” (Male, chairman in an 
Anatolian company).  
 
This flexibility appears even when they sign up new members for the business associations. 
The president of a sub-federation of TUSKON states that: 
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“We have one criterion when we sign up a new member; we don’t look at the political 
view, nor ethnicity. What we are looking for is straight/honest business history of the 
man/woman. This is the only criterion. We have members from different political 
views (left or right wing political parties). We have “Alevis” (A Turkish Shia sect). 
We have Kurds as well”. 
Interviewer: Isn’t religiosity a criterion? 
“No. As I told you, we have members consuming alcohol, or smoking. But I 
personally don’t drink and smoke”.   
 
This trend may also be interpreted as yet another confirmation of the underlying attributes of 
a certain Volkislam, perpetuated by a series of mystical beliefs (Mardin, 1986: 114).  
However, what remains to be explored is the centrality of the different groups to power and 
influence that is in the networks in which they are located. There is a difference between 
being included and being supported.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We presented a three layered framework, which summarizes our findings on the form and 
content of new and old business networks, across macro, meso and micro levels (See Table 
3). The table also elaborates on the interrelationship between these levels and explicates how 
we combine theorization of Granovetter with that of Bourdieu in order to account for 
continuity and change in business network relations in a dynamic political economy. Drawing 
on Granovetter, we illustrated how network relationships have changed and by mobilizing 
Bourdieu we showed that the emerging networks of elites did not only generate their own 
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logics but also interfered with old elites in multiple ways, sustaining the logic of the elite 
field in the country.     
 
Table 3: A layered framework for outlining the form and content of business networks  
Levels TUSIAD MUSIAD/TUSKON 
Macro-global Mature relationships based 
on formal ties 
Emergent relationships with 
innovative and informal ties 
Meso-national Strong relationships with the 
state, which are recently 
formed based on economic 
interests 
Strong relationships with the 
state, which are based on 
shared religious and regional 
affinities 
Micro-association Based on economic interests, 
size of business, and a 
reputation for being secular 
and modernist 
Originally based on religious 
and regional affinities. But 
more recently wider 
membership based on 
economic interests 
Interrelationship between 
layers 
Struggle to retain its 
traditional power and 
influence on government, 
through its economic 
influence and by building 
collaborations with state 
supported enterprises 
Struggle to join the national 
and global economic elite, 
with new interest in 
secularized discourse.   
Granovetter Strong ties with world Strong ties with the state, 
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economy, weak ties with 
religious networks 
weak ties with the global 
economy  
Bourdieu Old elite subject to new 
contextual pressures and 
different set of tastes and 
capitals, which are subject to 
change 
New elite subject to old 
contextual pressures and 
different set of tastes and 
capitals, which are subject to 
change 
 
While established metropolitan business elites adopt values directly linked to the global-
liberal pluralistic ideology throughout a mostly western orientation in education and 
socialization, the newly emerging counterparts construct ties to the same economic rationale 
with the help of both the preservation of traditional seriousness, and the not-too-much-
stabilized pluralism together with an implicit open-mindedness. It is observed that the degree 
of integration with the world-scale economic activities of the economic elites (exportation, 
distribution, provisory or permanent representation, production in foreign countries) enhances 
the capacity to develop global and liberal values. Nevertheless, in newly emerging Anatolian 
capital, this liberalism seems to realize itself as such, at least in most of the cases. 
 
On the contrary, what constitutes the appearance (manifest discourse as well as physical 
aspects) is more or less decorated with the well-known attributes and symbols of the Islamic 
conservatism. This is just at that point that the actual conservatism serves to establish social 
ties with ideologically-driven businesspeople associations or networks. Yet, we should also 
consider that ‘economic institutions do not emerge automatically in response to economic 
needs’ and structurally embedded individuals seem to have a major effect in the formation of 
institutional relations. (Granovetter, 1992:7)  These increased networks, in exchange, provide 
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them with their high motivation for the global liberal market, additional tools for the 
continuation of a growing commercial activity, while maintaining their conservatism in 
scope. The latter leads to a certain valorization of the attitude of respect for religious matters 
without creating an explicit contradiction between them and the liberal mind.  
 
In the context of this paper, it would make more sense if we examine the genealogies of the 
concept of “secular” which can be regarded as an unfolding of the essence of religion 
(Martin, 1978). Marcel Gauchet, a well-known French philosopher, argues that Western 
secularism can only be understood through the historicity of Christianity (Gauchet, 1997). 
Talal Asad goes even a step further and claims that every religion produces its own 
secularism (Asad, 1993). In his book, Formations of the Secular, Asad focuses on the roots of 
the concept, “the secular”: 
 
For at one time “the secular” was part of a theological discourse (saeculum). 
“Secularisation” (saecularisatio) at first denoted a legal transition from monastic life 
(regularis) to the life of canons (saecularis)--and then after the Reformation, it signified the 
transfer of ecclesiastical real property to laypersons, that is, to the “freeing” of property from 
church hands into the hands of private owners, thence into market circulation. (Asad, 
2003:192). 
 
This historical root of secularism also clarifies the understanding of “the secular” in the 
context that we are referring as one of the conclusion we made about the emergence of the 
religious business elites in Turkey.  Since Islam has different historical background and 
dynamics (Metcalfe, 2007) the Christian roots of the secular have to be different than Muslim 
ones. In the context of the religious business people, this conclusion refers to the Muslim 
business people’s transition towards a more rational and systematised way of doing business. 
 29 
 
The new Islamic discourse they have been producing can be regarded as signs of this 
secularisation. 
 
To conclude, our findings show that national context matters (Leat and El-Kot, 2007) and that 
contextual transformation had its repercussions in both business elite characteristics and elite 
networks in Turkey. Our study also reveals the significance of emic framing of context and 
demography as most of the contextual issues are unique and idiosyncratic, rather than etic 
and formulaic (Tatli and Ozbilgin, 2012). Both in-group characteristics and needs and 
contextual trends seem to influence business people networks. The desire to dominate or the 
possibility of recognizing different groups is related to the fit between the social, cultural and 
economic capitals possessed by the group and the contextual forces. We should also consider 
variability within national culture (Keles and Aycan, 2011).  Political context, in particular 
the interplay of religion, state, employers are ignored in the network theory, which assumes 
that context is fixed, and not relevant to such theorization. In the this paper, we show that we 
need to consider context more keenly as the institutional differences are often outcome of 
unique historical paths and we bring an assessment of power and context to Granovetter’s  
theorization. 
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Table 1. Businesspeople Associations 
 
Name Establishe
d in 
Headquarters 
at 
Foreign 
memberships 
Affiliated 
associations 
Foreign 
representatives 
Values Economic 
representation 
TÜSİAD 1971 
 
President: 
N.Ümit 
Boyner (F) 
1963 
RC+ 
University 
of 
Rochester 
Econ. 
Financial 
manager 
Istanbul 
 
Governing 
Board 
General 
Assembly 
High 
Consulate 
Council  
[Former 
presidents of 
TUSIAD + 
Former high 
bureaucrats] 
 
5 female 
members 
among 21 
board 
members 
 
2 female 
presidents 
Business 
Europe 
Businessmed 
UBCGE 
(Black 
sea&Caspian) 
 
Local 
businessmen 
associations 
with a –SİAD 
suffix 
All Young-
SİADs 
TÜSİAD Berlin 
Branch 
TÜSİAD Beijing 
Branch 
TÜSİAD Paris 
Branch 
TÜSİAD 
Washington Rep. 
TÜSİAD EU 
Brussels Rep. 
 
Productivity 
Sustainable 
economic 
growth 
Liberal 
economy 
Democratic 
standards 
Human rights 
Integration to 
EU 
Secular 
Members in industry 
and services sectors: 
85% of corporate 
taxes 
65% foreign trade 
(energy sector not 
included) 
65% industrial 
production 50% of 
added value 
50% of registered 
employment 
 
 
In 2009, 142 
member companies 
were in the largest 
500 list. 
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MÜSİAD 1991 
 
President: 
O.Cahit 
Vardan 
(M) 
1962 
ITU+Ohio 
State 
Ind.Eng. 
Businessm
an 
Istanbul 
 
Governing 
Board 
General 
Assembly 
High 
Consulate 
Council (no 
info) 
 
No female 
among 21 
board member 
 İSHAD 
3100 members 
in 33 branches 
4700 members 
of which 1650 
are Young-
MUSIAD 
15000 firms 
 
92 liaison offices 
in 43 countries 
“National 
Perspective” 
(Highly 
religious 
tendency 
favoring an 
industrial-basis 
development for 
an independent 
national context) 
 
Self 
development as 
well as national 
progress 
$3 bn./year of 
investment 
$90 bn. of GNP 
(15%); 
15% of employment 
17% of foreign trade 
Small and middle 
size firms 
 
In 2010, 31 member 
companies were in 
the largest 500 list. 
 
TUSKON 2005 
 
President: 
 
Rıza Nur 
Meral 
(M) 
1958 
METU Ind 
Eng. 
Top 
manager 
Istanbul 
 
Board of 
directors 
Supervisory 
board 
Board of 
regulations 
General 
Assembly 
 
2 female  out 
of  42  board 
directors 
No female 
presidents 
 TİM member 
Federations: 7 
regional 
business 
federations 
Associations: 
160 
businessmen 
associations in 
80 districts 
Brussels 
Beijing 
Moscow 
Washington 
Conservative 
Pragmatist 
Pro-Fethullah 
Gülen 
Community 
[Influential 
religious 
solidarity group] 
 
Self interest 
oriented 
 
25000  businessman 
and entrepreneur 
members 
624 firms 
Small and middle 
size firms 
Growing companies 
 
 In 2010, 92 member 
companies in the 
largest 500 list. 
Source: Collected from documents provided by TÜSIAD, MÜSIAD and TUSKON and their respective websites. 
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Table 2: Business Associations and Individual Characteristics of Their Members 
Name Economic 
capital 
Cultural capital 
Education 
Cultural capital 
Tastes 
Social capital 
Family 
TÜSİAD >500 million - 1 
billion USD 
 
Mostly large 
companies 
-Undergraduate degree often from a 
university in USA or UK.  
-Likely to have a graduate degree.   
-Often graduates of prestigious high 
schools where the instruction language is a 
foreign language.  
-Majority is able to speak more than one 
foreign language. Most of them have spent 
at least one year abroad. 
-Trend about collecting paintings and 
(to a much lower degree) antiquities 
as well. 
-Trend of establishing private 
universities bearing the name of the 
family. 
-Father profession industrialist 
-Half from non-metropolitan areas 
 
MÜSİAD-
TUSKON 
Mostly small 
and medium 
sized companies 
-Large majority does not have an 
undergraduate degree  
-None with a graduate degree. (The 
distance of the university to the city of 
dwelling appears as a major problem 
causing this limited time in educational 
institutions). 
- Half of the TUSKON members in our 
sample do not know any foreign language. 
Most of them seem to have spent little time 
abroad and only for business trips. 
 
-No collectors 
-Trend of getting together with 
similar others to create new 
universities usually for a 
“foundation” and getting actively 
involved in the board of trustees. 
-Father profession merchant or 
craftsman 
-All of them from non-metropolitan 
areas 
 
 
